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a finding, of likelihood of confusion, must be founded on a true similarity, and
not merely incidental business competition.
The Lanham act,15 which added to the scope of trade mark infringement,
allowing descriptive words to be registered if they were so indicative of their
owner as to have acquired a secondary meaning, does not go so far as to
prohibit the use of a portion of that title, by another, when it itself is
descriptive of content. "In order to establish a trade mark it must be shown
that 'the primary significance of the term in the minds of the consuming public
is not the product but the producer'."' 0 It is evident that here the word modern
has not become so identified in the minds of the public, as to warrant a finding
that use by another would be unfair competition. The Court pointed out that




COMPENSATION AwARD FOR DEATH CAUSED iBY EMOTIONAL STRESS
Does the New York Workmen's Compensation Law provide benefits for
worrying yourself to death over your job? Purportedly, the Court of Appeals
has answered this question affirmatively in the case of Klimas v. Trans
Caribbean Airways, Inc.' It is this writer's belief, and this note will seek to
show, that the jury is not in yet.
Edward Klimas was maintenance supervisor for the defendant airline.
When one of the defendant's two airplanes was grounded by the Civil Aero-
nautics Authority for wing corrosion in November 1955, Klimas was publicly
blamed and chastised for the incident by the defendant's president. From then
until the time of his death, March 10, 1956, he was under great pressure to
get the plane back in the air. The testimony was that he suffered great
emotional and mental anxiety because of the twin burdens of the threat to his
job and the responsibility for the plane. His deadline was the end of February
1956. On March 3, 1956, the plane was still not ready; so, Klimas went
personally to expedite the repair effort. At this time he was handed a bill for
$266,000 (representing 25%o of the plane's value). From March 3rd until his
death, he worked all day and into the night in an effort to get the bill reduced
as well as to speed the plane's repair. His efforts were unsuccessful in both
respects and the testimony of those who were there with him at this time was
15. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1958).
16. Supra note 10 at 137, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 402.
1. 10 N.Y.2d 209, 219 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1961). The order of the referee, reviewed and
affirmed by the Board, awarding death benefits to the plaintiff, the widow of decedent, was
reversed by the Appellate Division, 12 A.D.2d 551, 207 N.Y.S.2d 72 (3d Dep't 1960), on
the ground that no physical strain or exertion was shown.
COURT OF APPEALS, 1960 TERM
that he was very tired, very upset and very nervous. On the afternoon of his
death, following another fruitless bargaining session, Klimas, while resting at
the side of a swimming pool, suffered a coronary thrombosis, resulting in his
death from a myocardial infarction.
The Court held that previous awards of compensation for physical injuries
resulting from mental or emotional strain had been sustained; however, the
cases on which the majority relied, although mental and emotional stress was a
factor in each of them, went off on either the ground of fright2 or physical
exertion.
3
A tough hurdle for the majority was the case of Lesnik v. National Car-
loading Corp.,4 where death occurred at a racetrack while the decedent was
shepherding clients. That record did not have the quality of testimony indicating
both mental and physical stress that the present case contains, and the decision
then was that an industrial accident had not been made out. The Court here
distinguished the case on the quality of testimony and on the basis that in
Lesnik there was no evidence that the anxiety "went along" to the race track;
whereas, in Klimas the testimony was that decedent bore his burden to the
swimming pool.
The dissent relied on the Lesnik precedent, but placed its primary emphasis
on the point that it is not for the Court of Appeals to eradicate the concept of
"accident" from the Workmen's Compensation Law. This note cannot attempt
to deal with the raging controversy5 as to whether decisions such as this serve
to convert the compensation format into a health insurance scheme, although
this is probably the most serious question in the case. Rather, it must be limited
to the holding.
That holding, although clearly expressed by the Court, is qualified by these
three features of the opinion. First, the Court went to considerable pains in
establishing that physical exertion was present. Second, emphasis was placed
on the point that the gradual building up of pressure reached a climax in the
last week. Last, the cases cited by the Court deal with climactic occurrences and
physical exertion, thus discrediting the theory that this case opens a new area
of compensation liability.
To recapitulate, we have a decision that mental and emotional anxiety
resulting from on the job problems, causing a heart attack, is enough to make
2. Pickerell v. Schumacher, 242 N.Y. 577, 152 N.E. 434 (1926); Wachsstock v. Sky-
view Transp. Co., 279 App. Div. 831, 109 N.Y.S.2d 206 (3d Dep't 1952); Krawczyk v.
Jefferson Hotel, 278 App. Div. 731, 103 N.Y.S.2d 40 (3d Dep't 1951); Church v. County of
Westchester, 253 App. Div. 859 (3d Dep't 1938); Thompson v. City of Binghamton, 218
App. Div. 451, 218 N.Y. Supp. 355 (3d Dep't 1926).
3. Anderson v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 275 App. Div. 1010, 91 N.Y.S.2d 710
(3d Dep't 1949); Furtado v. American Export Airlines, 274 App. Div. 954, 83 N.Y.S.2d 745
(3d Dep't 1948).
4. 285 App. Div. 649, 140 N.Y.S.2d 907 (3d Dep't 1955), aff'd, 309 N.Y. 958, 132
N.E.2d 326 (1956).
5. See the Report of the Special Committee of the New York State Bar Association
to Study the Workmen's Compensation Law, January 1957, pp. 14-24.
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out an industrial accident. With all this, the Court relies on cases stating that
physical exertion or climactic incidents (in the nature of fright) are sufficient to
constitute an industrial accident, while saying that they are doing no more
than following precent.
It may well be that the headnote reader may feel assured that his client can
take his ulcer case to the Workmen's Compensation Board, but he had best be
prepared to show that something more than anxiety over business contributed to
its causation.
E.H.
"THiRD-PARTY" ACTIONS LIMITED TO IN-THE-COURsE OF EMPLOYMENT IN-
JURIES-STATE COMPENSATION BOARD'S JURISDICTION OVER INJURIES OC-
CURRING IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE EmPLOYMENT UPHELD
The case of Meachem v. New York Central R.R. Co.6 arose from a disputed
workmen's compensation death benefits award. The decedent-employee had
been injured in an in-the-course of employment accident in 1945, which left
him with an ulcer condition. Later, in 1948, the employee was involved in an
automobile collision, and his death from a perforated ulcer followed four months
later. The first defense the self-insured employer posed to the compensation
claim was that the claimants had settled a third-party action without its consent,
contrary to Section 29 of the Workmen's Compensation Law,7 by their
compromise of a wrongful death action based upon the automobile collision.
Next, the employer objected to the jurisdiction of the Compensation Board to
entertain a claim based upon an accident met with in interstate commerce
employment since the federal remedy for such accidents provided by the
Federal Employers' Liability Act8 was exclusive The Appellate Division
decided in favor of the employer, although expressly only upon the Section 29
ground. 10
The first defense raised a question as to what constitutes a proper third-
party action within the meaning of Section 29. That section merely requires
that the action be one which lies against a party "not in the same employ"
as the "employee" for that party's "wrong or negligence," which has "injured or
killed" the "employee," and for which injury the "employee" is "entitled to
compensation."" This description leaves undertermined whether the wrong
committed by the third party is limited to a wrong causing an in-the-course of
employment injury only, or extends to any wrong causing a subsequent injury
for which the employer is obligated in compensation. In-the-course of employ-
ment wrongs have been the almost singular subject of third-party actions, and
6. 8 N.Y.2d 293, 206 N.Y.S.2d 569 (1960).
7. N.Y. Workmen's Comp. Law § 29(1).
8. Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1958).
9. New York Central R.R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147 (1917).
10. Meachem v. New York Central R.R. Co., 7 A.D.2d 253, 182 N.Y.S.2d 501 (3d
Dep't 1959).
11. Supra note 7.
